Consideraciones Teóricas-Metodológicas de la Relación Ejecutivo-Legislativo en un Contexto de Gobierno Dividido.
Resumen
El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo presentar una exploración teórico-metodológica sobre la relación ejecutivo-legislativo en un contexto de gobierno dividido. A través de una un ejercicio de revisión documental se muestran interrogantes, hipótesis y metodologías empleadas por diversos trabajos, los cuales exponen los retos a los que se enfrentan los poderes del Estado cuando no están de acuerdo, así como los efectos que esto genera. Entre los principales hallazgos se considera que el control partidista del poder ejecutivo y legislativo no garantiza un buen gobierno, pero la división del control del partido lo impide. Asimismo, siempre que el partido que ostenta la mayoría en el congreso conserve un conflicto permanente con el partido que ocupa el ejecutivo tendrá efectos negativos en la aprobación de menos puntos en la agenda, se generara estancamientos y no se podrán llevar a cabo políticas que sean benéficas para la población.
Descargas
Citas
Acs, A. (2019) Congress and Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power, American Journal of Political Science 513-529. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12444.
Ansolabehere S., Palmer M., Schneer B. (2017) Divided Government and Significant Legislation: A History of Congress from 1789 to 2010, Social Science History 42, Spring 2018, pp. 81–108. doi:10.1017/ssh.2017.42.
Arnold Ch., Doyle, D., Wiesehomeier N. (2017), Presidents, Policy Compromise, and Legislative Success, The Journal of Politics, volume 79, number 2. Published online January 19, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/688080.
Banda, K., Kirkland, H (2017) Legislative Party Polarization and Trust in State Legislatures, American Politics Research 1–33. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X17727317.
Buchheim, L., Fretz, S. (2019) Parties, divided government, and infrastructure expenditures: Evidence from U.S. states, European Journal of Political Economy, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101817.
Brady, D. (1993) THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF AMERICAN POLITICS? American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 1 March 1993. DOI: 10.2307 / 2938966.
Bolton, A., Thrower, S. (2015) Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 00, No. 00, April 2015, Pp. 1–15. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12190.
Cestau, D. (2018) The political affiliation effect on state credit risk, Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175 (1), Pp. 135-154, abril. DOI: 10.1007 / s11127-018-0519-3.
Coleman, J. (1999) Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, American Political Science Review Vol. 93, No. 4 December 1999. DOI: 10.2307 / 2586115.
Cox, G., Samuel K. (eds) (1991) The Politics of Divided Government. Boulder CO: Westview Press. Deering CH.J, Maltzaman F. (1999) The Politics of Executive Orders: Legislative Constraints on Presidential Power, Political Research Quarterly, Vol.52, No. 4 (December 1999) pp. 767-783. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299905200405.
Crosson, J. (2018) Stalemate in the States: Agenda Control Rules and Policy Output in American Legislatures, Legislative Studies Quarterly, DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12210.
Edwards G, Barrett A, Peake J (1997) The Legislative Impact of Divided Government, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 2, April. DOI: 10.2307 / 2111776.
Lacy D, Niou, E. M. S. Paolino, P., Rein R. (2017) Measuring Preferences for Divided Government: Some Americans Want Divided Government and Vote to Create It Political Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9442-4.
Garmann, S. (2017): Political budget cycles and divided government, Regional Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2017.1316839.
Green, J., & Jennings, W. (2017) Party Reputations and Policy Priorities: How Issue Ownership Shapes Executive and Legislative Agendas, British Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000636.
Hicks, W. D. (2015) Partisan Competition and the Efficiency of Lawmaking in American State Legislatures, 1991-2009, American Politics Research 2015, Vol. 43(5) 743– 770. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X14564388.
Ingberman, D., Villani, J. (2014) An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 2, May 1993, Pp. 429-471. DOI: 10.2307 / 2111380.
Farhang, S., Yaver, M. (2016) Divided Government and the fragmentation of American Law, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 60, No. 2, April 2016, pp. 401-417. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12188.
Kirkland, P., Phillips, J. (2018) Is Divided Government a Cause of Legislative Delay, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2018, 13: 173–206. doi.org/10.1561/100.0001704.
Krehbiel, K. (1996), Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock A theory of Divided and Unified Government, Journal of Theoretical Politics 8(1): 7-40 (1996). DOI: 10.1177/0951692896008001002.
Kriner, D., Shwartz (2008) Divided Government and Congressional Investigations, Legislative Studies Quarterly, XXXIII, 2, May 2008, 295-32. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/40263459.
Lee, F. E.(2015) How Party Polarization Affects Governance, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 18, pp. 261-282, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2605439 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-113747.
Mulligan K. (2011) Partisan Ambivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and Divided Government, Political Psychology, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2011 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00830.x.
Rogers J. (2005) The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production, Public Choice (2005) 123: 217–233. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-0261-5.
Streb, J. M., Torrens, G. (2013) Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles, Public Choice, 156:703–722. DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-9923-2.
Derechos de autor 2023 Martín Alonso Juárez Armenta
Esta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento 4.0.
.jpg)
